| Kramer v. Union School District | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued January 16, 1969 Decided June 16, 1969 |
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| Full case name | Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Where a state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, it must be determined whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Warren, joined by Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall | |||||
| Dissent | Stewart, joined by Black, Harlan | |||||
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) was a United States Supreme Court decision in which a childless bachelor living with his parents in the Union School District challenged Section 2012 of the New York Education Law which stated that voters for school district elections must own or lease taxable realty property in the district or be parents or custodians of one or more children enrolled in a public school local to the district. New York's argument was to limit the franchise to those primarily affected by education.
The other stipulations of Section 2012, which were not in dispute, were that to be a registered voter in a school district election, the person must be a U.S. citizen, be a resident of the school district, and be at least 21 years old.
Lower courts had dismissed the claim but the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts on appeal finding the additional stipulations of realty property and parent or custodian of a child in a school in the district to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to vote.
Contents |
Stewart, Black, Harlan Dissenting: the test for whether a statue violates the equal protection clause is a simple one: legislation is only invalid if it rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation’s objectives. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections was deemed constitutional using that standard, states may impose rules on voting as long as it is reasonably designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. Residency requirement are also permissible, yet the plaintiff and the court here suggest this case falls under a different standard. [1]